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Preface
Too often, the need for job creation projects after serious conflict goes unrecognized and 
unmet. This paper discusses the main 
justifications for such projects, both 
short- and longer-term, and reviews 
some major lessons learned and best 
practices to guide their design and 
implementation. A central focus is the 
array of issues and challenges that must 
be worked out to permit a smooth 
transition from violent conflict and its 
attendant joblessness to a situation of 
stable, long-term employment capable 
of supporting a decent livelihood.
This study was originally suggested 
by the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization in the 
Department of State. Jason Aplon and 
Kirk Day of USAID provided valuable 
initial guidance in the development 
of the structure of the paper. Jessica 
Rodrigues, a graduate student in the 
School of Foreign Service at George-
town University, also assisted with the 
early development of the paper and  
suggested useful bibliography.
Over the course of writing the paper, 
several USAID personnel provided 
useful suggestions and comment. These 
included Charles “Fritz” Weden and 
Jeanne Briggs in the Bureau for De-
mocracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance’s Office of Transition Initia-
tives; Anne Ralte, Michael Crosswell, 
and Ann Phillips in the Bureau for 
Policy and Program Coordination 
(PPC) Office of Policy Planning; and 
Elaine Grigsby and Grant Morrill in 
PPC’s Office of Development Evalua-
tion and Information.
Kenneth W. Beasley 
Bureau for Policy and Program  
Coordination
Office of Development Evaluation and 
Information
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Overview
This paper discusses the main justifications for job creation projects after serious conflict or 
natural disaster. It then reviews ma-
jor lessons and best practices to guide 
the design and implementation of job 
creation projects as components of 
peacekeeping, humanitarian, tran-
sitional, or transformational devel-
opment programs. It also explores prin-
cipal issues and challenges that must 
be worked out for a smooth transition 
from serious crisis to stable, long-term 
employment.
Why Job Creation 
Projects Are Important
Despite evidence that jobs play a major 
role in successful peacekeeping, donors 
do not always make job creation the 
high priority it should be. Emergency 
job creation should properly be con-
sidered an integral part of a program 
of comprehensive humanitarian relief.1 
It is a basic building block of the peace 
process, and it continues to be impor-
tant as the country and economy make 
the critical transition from crisis to a 
“normal” situation. 
Yet even when job creation projects are 
developed and implemented, they are 
often very short-term, with no linkages 
to the long-term employment promo-
tion efforts needed to support the peace 
and rebuilding process after the first year 
or two. Other common donor errors 
include waiting too long to start, not 
realizing that job creation can begin in 
one part of a country even while fight-
ing is continuing in another, and using 
expatriate labor and imported heavy 
machinery in postconflict reconstruc-
tion work instead of using local labor 
and more labor-intensive technology. In 
addition, donors who commit money 
for recovery programs shortly after a 
conflict ends all too often deliver only a 
fraction of the sums originally promised, 
with unfortunate results both economi-
cally and politically.
Even donors who fund job programs, 
and postconflict aid in general, for sev-
eral years following a conflict often al-
low aid to dwindle after the first year or 
two. Yet research shows that assistance is 
most effective if it rises in tandem with 
the recovering economy’s ability to make 
good use of it, usually after the first 
three years. Accordingly, monitoring 
and evaluation activities associated with 
postconflict assistance programs should 
Executive Summary
 Emergency job creation should properly be 
considered an integral part of a program of 
comprehensive humanitarian relief.
1 In this paper, humanitarian relief refers to 
assistance specifically directed at improving the 
welfare of individuals and groups distressed by 
conflict or other disaster, and emergency job 
creation refers to short-term, project-based 
postconflict or postcrisis job creation responses 
to widespread unemployment.
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buildings and roads; farm and fish-
ery rehabilitation; and small-business 
support through microcredit, training, 
and market assistance. Perceptions of 
group entitlements to jobs, microcredit, 
etc., in emergency job creation projects 
should be strictly avoided. 
As emergency postconflict employment 
winds down, planning for longer-term 
permanent employment must begin 
with preliminary assessments of the 
demographic and economic character-
istics of the working-age population in 
former conflict areas. The easiest way 
to make workforce determinations is 
through community surveys. 
Local Economic 
Development and Job 
Promotion 
Economic development and permanent 
job creation occur together. Measures 
to encourage local economic develop-
ment should begin as soon as there are 
viable prospects for peace. Private sector 
initiatives should be actively promoted, 
and assistance to micro- and small 
enterprise development, smallholder 
agriculture, cooperatives for farmers 
and other producers, and public-private 
partnerships is appropriate at all stages 
of postconflict recovery.
Early support of local civil society 
groups interested in economic develop-
ment and livelihoods may reduce future 
external aid needs as communities’ 
capacity and initiative grow. Technical 
focus on both near-term (emergency) 
and long-term job creation successes 
and failures, as well as their impact on 
the related overriding objective of sus-
taining peace.
Job Creation Challenges
After conflict ends, extensive market 
inefficiencies make a country’s labor 
market unstable and unpredictable. 
Major problems include the destruc-
tion of infrastructure and capital assets, 
a lack of savings and investment, lost 
markets, unstable government and 
financial structures, and the absence or 
disarray of potential employers. In such 
a situation, there are far too few jobs for 
those who want them, and those jobs 
often pay much less than conflict-related 
work did. Moreover, job-seekers’ skills 
are often ill suited to postcrisis rebuild-
ing requirements. 
Affected groups that may need special 
consideration include anyone with  
prior conflict-related employment  
(especially ex-combatants), displaced 
persons seeking reintegration, women, 
youth, the disabled, people with ob-
solete or redundant skills, and other 
vulnerable groups. No group should be 
singled out for special treatment while 
others are ignored, however, as this 
could rekindle or perpetuate some of the 
problems that led to the initial conflict. 
Emergency job creation projects should 
be expressly designed to respond to local 
community circumstances, with local 
inputs, priorities, and ownership. They 
should be rapid-response, flexible, and 
geared to short-term, limited com-
munity-rebuilding objectives. Projects 
may involve community cleanup, 
sanitation, and reconstruction of vital 
help and funding should be available 
for long-term job promotion activities, 
including counseling, training, finding 
and providing information about jobs, 
and job placement. 
Decentralization is essential for long-
term national economic development 
and permanent job creation; donors 
should work with host country stake-
holders in building local capacity to 
promote economic growth. Careful 
assessment and monitoring are essential. 
Local authorities should be encouraged 
to organize partnerships among local 
government institutions, private busi-
nesses, and community groups to pur-
sue local economic development goals. 
Responsive government institutions and 
an honest, transparent regulatory frame-
work are vital if the private sector is to 
rise to the challenges of reconstruction 
and be an engine of economic growth 
and new employment. Particularly 
important are viable legal institutions 
that guarantee property rights and the 
sanctity of contracts, along with prop-
erly functioning financial markets and 
supporting institutions.
Creating an Enabling 
Policy Environment
Economic growth, essential for long-
term job creation, can sometimes be 
stimulated by favoring responsive, reas-
suring social policies at the expense of a 
small deterioration in macro balances. 
Nonetheless, quickly putting in place 
 As emergency postconflict employment winds 
down, planning for longer-term permanent 
employment must begin.
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and adhering to responsible, orthodox 
national economic policies is timely and 
appropriate after a crisis. These should 
stabilize macroeconomic financial struc-
tures enough to keep inflation within 
acceptable bounds, without being so 
rigorous as to stall social and economic 
recovery and job creation. 
Basic economic governance institutions 
are just as important as sound economic 
policies, as policies mean little if they 
cannot be implemented. It is especially 
important that a government not an-
nounce far-ranging reforms it cannot 
implement. Credibility is an important 
asset that governments cannot afford  
to waste, especially in postconflict  
situations.
A major goal of postconflict economic 
policy is to encourage the recovery of 
the country’s local and national markets 
as well as its participation in regional 
and international export markets. 
Both factors condition the pace of job 
growth. Accordingly, getting and keep-
ing prices right is an important policy 
objective. Realizing this objective re-
quires minimizing interference in prices, 
whether for goods and services, money 
(interest rates), or foreign exchange. 
National and local governments and  
donors should make a concerted effort 
to prioritize, coordinate, and evaluate 
their spending within a coherent eco-
nomic policy framework. This framework 
should explicitly take into account the 
likelihood of limited revenue collection, 
combined with the need for relatively 
high spending by the government and 
donors on extensive humanitarian relief, 
social protection programs, and recon-
struction. 
Overall economic policies should 
provide a generally liberal environment 
oriented specifically to facilitate and 
support private sector investment and 
job creation.Tax policy should empha-
size a business-friendly tax system that 
is relatively easy to apply and does not 
tax labor so heavily as to discourage 
private sector hiring. 
Trade restrictions should be kept to a 
minimum. Flexible exchange rates, like 
other good economic policies, make 
investors confident. In addition, tar-
geted official and private sector export 
promotion activities will usually result 
in faster permanent job creation. 
The effectiveness of long-term private 
sector job creation can be expected to 
vary in accordance with the sophis-
tication of political and economic 
governance institutions; the country’s 
core economic policy framework; the 
flexibility of the incentives framework 
of business taxes; the legislation, rules, 
and regulations affecting the formation 
of new businesses; and the conditions 
of employment, worker compensation, 
and the like. 
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Introduction
Failure to keep the peace is a common occurrence. This is why a “postconflict” designation 
can be fleeting and imprecise: it may 
only describe a country’s situation for a 
short time unless necessary and effec-
tive measures are put in place. Large 
numbers of unemployed are among the 
factors likely to destabilize the peace 
process, which could lead to renewal 
of conflict. For example, reintegrating 
ex-combatants and conflict-displaced 
persons into their communities typi-
cally requires local job opportunities.2 
Yet often only precarious employ-
ment—usually self-employment in 
the informal economy or subsistence 
farming—is available for even for the 
most industrious and independent 
conflict survivors. The jobless or un-
deremployed, especially the young, are 
easier to recruit as the shock troops of 
renewed violence.
In postconflict situations, therefore, 
early job creation activities are generally 
an essential element in preserving the 
peace. Indeed, the assurance of emer-
gency short-term jobs is an immedi-
ate priority that should be addressed 
at the same time efforts are made to 
secure a safe physical environment; 
provide food, shelter, and healthcare; 
and restore basic services. Surprisingly, 
job creation is not always a priority 
in postconflict planning, even though 
“normal” employment may not be 
generally available. Moreover, there has 
been very little systematic treatment 
of lessons and best practices to guide 
the design and implementation of job 
creation projects in the aftermath of 
serious conflict. 
This paper sketches the dimensions of 
the problem and discusses the main 
justifications for job creation projects as 
components of peacekeeping, humani-
tarian, transitional, and transformation-
al development programs. 3 The paper 
also outlines the principal challenges 
that must be met, from postconflict 
2 In this paper, reintegration refers to the reentry of 
ex-combatants; conflict support persons; family 
members of ex-combatants and support persons; 
and refugees and other displaced persons to 
local communities and productive civilian life. This 
process may include some kind of compensation, 
training, jobs, or other income-generating 
assistance.
3 In this paper, humanitarian relief refers to 
assistance specifically directed at improving the 
welfare of individuals and groups distressed 
by conflict or other disaster. This definition is 
consistent with USAID’s categories of disaster 
assistance, as outlined in ADS 251: (1) disaster 
relief intended to address immediate life-
threatening concerns; (2) disaster rehabilitation 
and reconstruction to assist a community’s  
return to viability and reduce its vulnerability to 
future disasters; and (3) prevention, mitigation, 
and preparedness assistance to reduce risks to 
vulnerable people and economic assets posed 
 Reintegrating ex-combatants and conflict- 
displaced persons into their communities typically 
requires local job opportunities.
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destruction and chaos to problems with 
the distribution and flow of donor aid. 
It explores characteristics of successful 
and unsuccessful job creation programs, 
with particular attention to mechanisms 
and timing. Finally, it describes enabling 
conditions for effective job creation, 
including the role of education, civil 
society, and community dynamics, as 
well as government handling of such 
issues as money supply, trade, business 
regulation, and finance.
Successful peacekeeping often requires 
linkages to programs generating long-
term, livelihood-sustaining employ-
ment as well. Thus, transformational de-
velopment activities should be initiated 
during the transition period of emer-
gency job creation and reconstruction. 
As employment grows in a postconflict 
country, so will the chances for a  
lasting peace.
 by natural and manmade disasters. Emergency 
job creation refers to short-term, project-based 
postconflict job creation programs that respond 
to widespread unemployment as a component 
of humanitarian and transition assistance 
programs. Emergency job creation is particularly 
relevant to successful community reintegration. 
of ex-combatants, displaced persons, and 
other victims of conflict in circumstances of 
high unemployment. As this paper will show, 
postconflict assistance also needs to build bridges 
to longer-term employment opportunities.
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flicts lasting a decade or longer are not 
uncommon.
While conflict is not confined to the 
developing world, it hits this vulnerable 
population the hardest. Since 1980, 
nearly 50 percent of the world’s least 
developed countries have suffered a ma-
jor conflict (AusAID website). Sixteen 
of the world’s 20 poorest countries—an 
astonishing 80 percent—have been 
stricken by a major war in the past 15 
years. Many of these “are locked in a 
tragic vicious circle where poverty causes 
conflict and conflict causes poverty. . . . 
Even with rapid progress after peace, it 
Job Creation Challenges
A ccording to F. Stewart et al. (2001), “the greater part of the human costs of war does 
not result directly from battle deaths 
and injuries, but rather ‘indirectly’ 
from the loss of livelihoods caused by 
the dislocation of economy and soci-
ety resulting from conflict.” Indeed, 
conflict-induced labor market prob-
lems may result in serious, widespread 
structural unemployment that can jeop-
ardize peace and take years to repair. 
This section will examine the myriad 
ways conflict destroys people’s means of 
earning a living, even after the violence 
has stopped, and the equally diverse 
ways that job creation programs can 
help to rebuild and heal a conflict-torn 
land.
The Scope of Conflict 
Worldwide
Conflicts—large and small, internal and 
external—affect dozens of countries 
annually in virtually every region of 
the globe. There were between 29 and 
36 conflicts worldwide in 2003 alone 
(table 1). Some of these may have been 
relatively short-lived, but violent con-
 Within five years of ending a war, countries face 
a 44 percent chance of relapsing into conflict. 
Economic factors are a major reason.
TABLE 1. ARMED CONFLICTS IN 
2003
REGION PLOUGHSHARES  
MONITOR
JOURNAL OF 
PEACE
Africa 15 10
Asia 15 14
Europe 2 1
Americas 1 3
Middle East 3 3
Total 36 29
Note. The Ploughshares Monitor reported 36 armed conflicts 
in 28 countries in 2003; the Journal of Peace, 29 conflicts 
in 22 countries. The discrepancies are due to differences 
in definitions and clarity. For example, Ploughshares shows 
Angola-Cabinda, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo as “in conflict”; Journal of Peace classifies 
the first four as “unclear,” and makes no mention of Congo. 
Ploughshares includes Kosovo, Journal of Peace does not. The 
two also differ on whether or how classify and count six 
conflicts in India and three in Indonesia.
Source. Project Ploughshares 2004; Eriksson and  
Wallensteen 2004.
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can take a generation or more just to re-
turn to prewar living standards” (World 
Bank website).
It is true that the causes of conflict (see 
USAID 2004b) may include many 
noneconomic factors, such as ethnic and 
regional hostilities, political tensions, 
ideological and religious differences, 
or the desire to rectify inequalities or 
attain independence. Many of these, 
however, are driven or worsened by lack 
of jobs or other economic opportunities, 
or disagreements over resource use, or 
simple greed. 
If economic causes, including unem-
ployment, are not addressed in the 
short- and long-term responses to 
conflict, then the problems are apt to 
bubble over into conflict again. In fact, 
on average, within five years of ending a 
war countries face a 44 percent chance 
of relapsing into conflict (World Bank 
website). Susan L. Woodward states that 
economic factors “play a more signifi-
cant role in the failure of peace agree-
ments than they do in the success of 
such initiatives” (2002, 2).
Economic Impacts of 
Conflict 
Some basic tasks that need to be focused 
on soon after hostilities have stopped 
include4
• arranging basic humanitarian relief, 
including emergency job creation 
projects (to generate confidence in 
the peace process)
• promoting rapid economic recovery, 
including systematic handoffs from 
any emergency job creation projects 
to long-term livelihood employment 
(to consolidate confidence in the 
peace process)
• completing specific commitments, 
such as demobilization and refugee 
return, contained in the peace  
agreement
• creating or rebuilding the founda-
tions necessary to sustain the peace 
over the long term, particularly a vig-
orous peacetime economy supported 
by political and economic institutions
The last task in this list—rebuilding a 
vigorous economy—is much more easily 
said than done, because a nation’s econ-
omy is typically radically reduced when 
serious conflict winds down or ends. 
Populations have been dislocated, farms 
ruined, capital assets destroyed, lives and 
livelihoods lost, and the natural environ-
ment ravaged. Crime, death, and disease 
are widespread, while GDP, savings, 
and the output of tradables are are often 
mere shadows of what they were before. 
Basic services, including education, have 
ceased or been substantially disrupted. 
Moreover, conflict has severely warped 
the underlying structure of the econo-
my. Basic social and physical infrastruc-
ture, essential to the smooth operation 
of a market economy, is generally badly 
damaged, making it harder to access 
normal domestic and international 
markets and raising transaction costs. 
Institutions of governance have been 
compromised and disabled, and macro-
economic financial structures have been 
destabilized. Public and private invest-
ment has been on hold throughout the 
conflict. Potential employers are absent 
or in disarray. Customers abroad have 
turned elsewhere; those at home may 
be dead or destitute. Accordingly—and 
despite the likelihood that conflict has 
reduced the number of people in the 
labor force—unemployment is high 
even before ex-combatants demobilize 
and displaced persons return to their 
communities. 
Because citizens’ knowledge, skills, and 
abilities have deteriorated or become 
outdated, there are extensive mismatch-
es between the employment qualifica-
tions of the workforce and the needs of 
postconflict societies. Contributing to 
the problem is the mismatch between 
conflict-related and postconflict wage 
structures and levels. Conflict-related 
activities are likely to have paid better 
wages than the few jobs available in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict.
Pervasive uncertainty, exacerbated by 
lack of economic opportunity, can be 
the trigger that destroys prospects for 
peaceful solutions. Rebels, soldiers, and 
others leaving behind conflict-related 
jobs must be quickly employed, even 
if temporarily. Should relatively decent 
jobs be unavailable, ex-combatants may 
rekindle the conflict. Lack of jobs may 
have been an important factor in the 
demobilization failures of Somalia, for 
example. 
4 See, for example, the discussion in Woodward 
(2002, 3).
 Lack of jobs may have been an important factor in 
the demobilization failures of Somalia.
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The Need for Early  
Job Creation
Job creation projects are among the 
most effective means of stabilizing 
communities and keeping the peace 
immediately after conflict, offering a 
fundamental basis for healing and rec-
onciliation. Employment provides access 
to resources, generates confidence in the 
future, creates a stake in an expected 
recovery, and moderates the conditions 
of want that may have been root causes 
of conflict. Unfortunately, as Woodward 
points out, “[Postconflict] development 
assistance and advice is still focused on 
laying the basis for economic growth in 
the long run, and assumes that employ-
ment will naturally follow” (2002, 5). It 
is true that with enough time, perma-
nent job opportunities will develop as 
economic recovery occurs—but the un-
employed cannot wait for the long run.
The cost of early job creation is some-
times substantial. Nevertheless, the cost 
of renewed conflict is generally several 
orders of magnitude greater. The bot-
tom line is that emergency job creation 
programs and projects buy time until 
the private sector can grow enough to 
absorb the labor supply at stable,  
market-clearing wages. 
In addition to local and regional emer-
gency job programs, which could include 
small, local cleanup and basic reconstruc-
tion projects, technical assistance and 
funding should be available for local 
economic development work and for 
counseling, training, and placement of 
the unemployed and underemployed in 
permanent jobs. Later sections of this 
paper will consider these components of 
postconflict jobs efforts in more detail. 
First, however, it will review questions of 
timing and funding mechanisms that are 
broadly applicable to such efforts.
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Timing of Assistance
Resource mobilization mecha-nisms for funding postconflict recovery are not as well estab-
lished as those available for humani-
tarian crises (Salomons 2002). This 
is regrettable, because humanitarian 
assistance, which includes emergency 
job creation, can and should begin as 
early as possible—indeed, it can be 
undertaken while parts of a country 
are still in conflict. Even economic 
development can take place when parts 
of a country are at war (Mendelson 
Forman 2002). In fact, contrary to the 
traditional working assumption of do-
nors that peacebuilding must precede 
development, “economic development 
is complementary to the political and 
security elements of peacebuilding, and 
so measures to promote economic de-
velopment must begin as soon as there 
is even a prospect of peace” (Haughton 
1998, 2).
Although from a planning standpoint 
many things should logically be started 
immediately, it is important to priori-
tize and phase in increasingly complex 
Donor Engagement: When and How
development activities in a sustained, 
incremental fashion over a period of 
years. As Collier and Hoeffler have 
noted, a developing country’s ability 
to make good use of outside aid after a 
conflict—its “absorptive capacity”—var-
ies depending on the amount of time 
that has elapsed since the violence ended 
(2002a, i):
 During the first three post-conflict 
years, absorptive capacity is no greater 
than normal, but . . . in the rest of 
the first decade it is approximately 
double its normal level. So ideally, aid 
should phase in during the decade. 
Historically, aid has not, on average, 
been higher in post-conflict societies, 
and it has tended to taper out over 
the course of the decade.
Job creation activities require significant 
up-front commitments, but funding 
need not decline as the phase of emer-
gency job creation is stepped down and 
longer-term job promotion activities be-
come the focus. On the contrary, since 
aid appears to be most effective between 
approximately the fourth and the sev-
enth postconflict years (ibid., 6), donors 
should take advantage of the increased 
energy and synergy of this period.
Of course, every postconflict situation 
is different, and job creation programs 
should be customized to respond to the 
on-the-ground situation of a particular 
country. In addition, as Dirk Salomons 
has said, “there is never a clear cutoff 
 Humanitarian assistance, emergency job creation, 
and even economic development can all take 
place while parts of a country are still at war.
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struction assistance, resulting in nomi-
nally strong economic growth of 140 
percent during the 1995–99 period.5 
Unfortunately, the size of the economy 
in 1999 was still less than 50 percent of 
its size in the early 1990s. Slow prog-
ress on transition reforms contributed 
to a weak private sector response and 
persistent high unemployment of 16–40 
percent (depending on how it was 
measured). By the end of 2002, unem-
ployment was over 41 percent of the 
economically active population; about 
one-third were demobilized soldiers and 
4 percent family members of deceased 
or disabled soldiers. 
USAID is among those donors that 
take the need for job creation seriously. 
It routinely includes job creation and 
livelihood-rebuilding activities in its hu-
manitarian and transition assistance pro-
gramming and has published a policy 
paper and implementation guidelines on 
assistance to internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). The policy mainly focuses on 
protection and personal security issues, 
but provides for restoration and creation 
of livelihood opportunities in each of 
the five phases of addressing displace-
ment: preemergency preparedness, 
early emergency, care and maintenance, 
transitional reintegration, and long-
term development (USAID 2004a). For 
states in crisis, USAID’s fragile states 
strategy places job creation high on the 
list of programmatic options (along 
with income generation and school 
enrollment), especially for underserved 
populations and IDPs (USAID 2005). 
Mechanisms of Job  
Creation Programs
Donors may choose among a number of 
mechanisms for providing postconflict 
job creation assistance. Should the 
national government be strong and 
credible enough, budget support 
earmarked for government-sponsored 
emergency employment projects in war-
torn communities would be appropriate 
during the first few years after the end 
of serious conflict. This support can be 
disbursed to the central government, 
which in turn distributes it to local gov-
ernments for emergency job programs, 
social infrastructure rebuilding, and 
local economic development priorities. 
Budget support should be reserved for 
strengthening a public sector that, al-
though resource poor, is judged capable 
of sound fiscal and budget management. 
When it encourages central and local 
governments to development and imple-
ment their own reconstruction and 
institutional rebuilding, budget support 
instills a kind of ownership that donors 
cannot otherwise duplicate, and it may 
help to promote a lasting peace process. 
This type of funding is necessarily short 
term, perhaps three or four years, but 
can easily be reduced as a government 
point where humanitarian assistance 
ends and postconflict reconstruction can 
begin” (2002, 5). With respect to job 
programs, this underscores the likeli-
hood that there may be a substantial 
overlap between the need for short-term 
emergency job projects (which are basi-
cally humanitarian aid) and the need 
for short- and long-term training and 
placement in permanent jobs.
Donor Commitment to 
Job Creation
Unfortunately, creating jobs is not 
always a high donor priority, despite 
evidence that the dignity and income 
that a good job bestows are major deter-
minants of successful peacekeeping (see 
discussion in Woodword 2002, 5–6). 
Donor preferences are geared to provid-
ing technical assistance that—though 
often useful—does not employ large 
numbers of nationals. Even when job 
creation projects are developed and 
implemented, they are too often short 
term—and shortsighted—with few, if 
any, linkages to the long-term employ-
ment needed to support the peace and 
rebuilding process.
In addition, even when donors promise 
funding for employment programs, 
they may be slow to deliver. Of more 
than $5 billion pledged by 12 donors 
for emergency job programs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, only $146 million was 
committed and $115 million actually 
disbursed by May 1999. Donors did 
provide substantial technical and recon-
5 For more information on the postwar economy 
and employment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
see World Bank 2000; Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations 
n.d.; and World Bank 2003.
 Donor preferences are geared to providing 
technical assistance that—though often useful—
does not employ large numbers of nationals.
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develops larger revenue streams on its 
own. 
Donors may also disburse funding for 
job creation activities in the form of 
grants to nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) or contractors, or directly 
to communities who have taken the ini-
tiative to request employment aid. Such 
project-based aid may replace budget 
support in situations where budget sup-
port is inappropriate, or it may supple-
ment budget support. 
Monitoring and evaluation activities 
associated with a postconflict assistance 
and job creation program must focus on 
the appropriateness and execution of the 
modalities chosen; the implementation 
of the results framework in terms of op-
erational inputs, outputs, and outcomes 
such as cost, number of jobs created, 
or contributions to household income 
and welfare; and the program’s impact 
on the overriding objective of sustaining 
the peace.
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A s noted earlier, employment should be an integral part of comprehensive postconflict 
programs. This effort should begin 
with emergency job projects in the 
mainly humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction phases, continuing 
through aggressive long-term employ-
ment promotion in the mainly trans-
formational development phase of 
significantly increased donor assistance. 
Projects should be demand driven and 
community owned. 
Note that if there is a functioning legal 
government, the presumption is that the 
primary authority and responsibility for 
relief efforts rests with that government 
and that government must agree to the 
assistance—unless denial would result 
in starvation of certain distressed groups 
(Dungel 2004, part 2.3). It is true that 
in the case of most postconflict relief 
efforts, the international community is 
likely to be dealing with failed or weak 
states with limited ability to take the 
lead. Even so, sovereign governments 
have the primary responsibility, and 
relief efforts, including job creation pro-
grams, should be undertaken in collabo-
ration with national and community 
authorities.
Emergency Job Creation
Emergency employment programs can 
be national in scope, but specific, short-
term projects generally work better 
when organized locally. They should be 
geared to local circumstances, with local 
preferences, commitments, and inputs 
being primary in establishing project 
priorities. Involving local governments 
and local private-sector actors in recon-
struction and job creation projects is an 
effective way to get whole communities 
engaged in overcoming postconflict 
problems. 
Programs of emergency job creation 
should be collaborative and participa-
tory, flexible, and rapid-response. Nor-
mally they should be directly related 
to specific short-term projects ranging 
in length from 30 to 180 days, even 
though several distinct projects may 
be necessary over the course of several 
years (depending on the conditions 
encountered). Projects should be short 
term both to discourage workers from 
thinking of the job as an entitlement 
and to better facilitate eventual handoffs 
to permanent jobs. 
Each project would ideally have a 
unique public service or rebuilding 
Employment Priorities
 Involving local governments and local private-
sector actors in reconstruction and job creation 
projects is an effective way to get whole 
communities engaged in overcoming postconflict 
problems.
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objective. Properly designed emergency 
job creation projects are not unproduc-
tive “make work” schemes. Although 
these projects, or series of projects, may 
be viewed as buying time until condi-
tions permit jobseekers to integrate into 
normal labor markets, they should only 
be undertaken if useful end products 
can be clearly identified and the funds 
spent properly accounted for. It may be 
beneficial to develop and implement 
several short-term job creation projects 
concurrently or consecutively in a par-
ticular community. 
Emergency job creation wages are usu-
ally paid completely in cash, but food-
for-work programs can be useful in the 
early stages of an emergency job creation 
program, provided that the food is not 
of the kind and quantity that discourag-
es the restarting of farm activities neces-
sary for local, country, or regional food 
security and rural livelihoods. A mix of 
food and cash could be appropriate in 
some postconflict circumstances, espe-
cially because food can be sold for cash. 
Selling too much food, however, could 
drive down farm prices and discount the 
value of the labor provided.
Projects designed for emergency job 
creation by definition use labor-inten-
sive techniques, which are cost-effective 
for a wide range of community rebuild-
ing needs. Should donors use a prime 
international contractor for emergency 
job creation projects, the contractor 
should in turn use local subcontractors 
for actual hiring and execution. This 
reinforces the principle and spirit of 
ownership initiated with local selection 
of projects to be undertaken.
Simple, straightforward projects that 
have multiple impacts are generally the 
most efficient and cost-effective. An 
ideal job project would not only provide 
short-term interim employment, but 
also result in something of lasting ben-
efit. It should also lay the foundation for 
an effective long-term labor force and 
promote employment and development 
activities. Examples of limited-objective, 
labor-intensive projects would be debris 
and trash removal, sanitation, and small-
scale community infrastructure rehabili-
tation such as schools, public buildings, 
and roads. Agricultural rehabilitation 
can also provide jobs while restoring lo-
cal and national food security.
Larger public works projects using 
labor-intensive techniques, such as 
regional road-building, would be useful, 
but few donors are willing to undertake 
them. Despite the evident need to use 
local jobseekers in large reconstruction 
projects, it is more usual to find donors 
involved in large public works projects 
with imported machinery and imported 
semiskilled and skilled labor. It is reli-
ably estimated that labor-based work 
methods for infrastructure rebuilding 
can generate two to four times the num-
ber of jobs that using capital-intensive, 
equipment-based methods does, with 
same investment or less (Shone 2003).
As emergency postconflict employment 
winds down, longer-term permanent 
employment must be planned for and 
provided. Planning must begin with 
preliminary assessments of the demo-
Reconstruction Using Local Labor Helps to Jumpstart Economy 
in Timor-Leste
A modest Transitional Employment Program (TEP) conducted by USAID’s Office of 
Transition Initiatives (OTI) in Timor-Leste (East Timor) in 1999–2000 demonstrates 
the value of using local labor for reconstruction projects. The TEP, which involved 469 
small grants totaling about $4 million, benefited more than 63,000 people. Other 
donors financed substantial reconstruction using imported equipment and imported 
labor, while up to 75 percent of the new country’s labor force was unemployed.
The OTI TEP in Timor-Leste was designed to be short, and meet key, but limited, tran-
sition objectives. These objectives, all of which were met, included the following:
• create short-term employment throughout the country
• inject liquidity into local economies
• visibly jumpstart reconstruction activities before larger multilateral initiatives com-
menced
• help provide UN district structures with resources to engage communities
Subsequent OTI programs in Timor-Leste, responding to an improved humanitarian 
situation, mainly focused on community stabilization with grants to finance building 
restorations, irrigation and clean water systems, and road repairs. Although the OTI 
funding did not cover wages, significant numbers of community jobs were created. 
Source: USAID 2000a and Mason et al. 2002. 
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graphic and economic characteristics 
of the working age population in the 
principal areas of a country recover-
ing from conflict. Approximate basic 
demographic information can be 
gathered and analyzed to establish the 
main characteristics of the postconflict 
population, including age, sex, house-
hold size, and characteristics of heads 
of household. This information should 
be cross-tabulated with education and 
types of employment experience before 
and during the conflict and employ-
ment status at the time of the survey. 
The easiest way to make workforce 
determinations is through coordinated 
local community surveys. 
It is important to measure the results 
and impacts of emergency job pro-
grams. On the results side, the number 
of short-term jobs created should be 
tracked and compared to credible esti-
mates of the number of people needing 
and seeking jobs. The lower the ratio of 
unemployed in the total work force, the 
greater the success. The main impact 
variables are how well the job program 
succeeds in raising family incomes, with 
the ultimate focus, as mentioned earlier, 
on keeping the peace. 
Private Sector Focus 
In most postconflict societies, private 
sector enterprises are the principal 
generators of future economic growth 
and permanent job creation. The 
private sector, including international 
enterprises that can invest on their own 
account or partner with local firms, is 
generally “unmatched in its ability to 
assemble people, capital and innova-
tion to create meaningful jobs and to 
profitably produce goods and services 
that meet the needs and requirements of 
people” (Muia 2003, 259). All nationals 
(resident and expatriate) with investable 
assets should therefore be encouraged 
to start or invest in a new business, or 
invest in the expansion of a business. 
Every opportunity to jumpstart the local 
private sector must be exploited, begin-
ning with establishing local priorities 
for community-level projects that can 
use local private initiative and talent. 
Postconflict reintegration and recon-
struction should be combined whenever 
possible, even if longer time frames are 
necessary. When serious reconstruction 
projects are underway, incentives should 
be provided to international contractors 
to subcontract with domestic and local 
companies that employ local labor. Lo-
cal governments may find it efficient to 
contract with small local entrepreneurs 
to provide many of the services that 
are often provided by local or regional 
governments.
Funding should also be provided for 
the recovery of local small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), which will probably 
be the principal local sources of long-
term employment in most postconflict 
communities. There are a variety of 
ways to revitalize SME activity. For ex-
ample, funds could be lent to local firms 
and the loans repaid in kind for use in 
other projects. This kind of stimulus 
was successfully used by USAID’s Office 
of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in its 
Kosovo Transition Initiative Program 
(ReliefWeb 2000, USAID 2000b). 
Private Businesses’ Contributions to Postconflict Recovery
Besides providing jobs and helping to supply goods and services, a country’s private 
sector can help it recover from conflict in many other ways:
• wealth creation: businesses invest, create wealth, and pay taxes
• job creation and community stabilization: postconflict resumption of business activi-
ties generates jobs, gives people a stake in their communities, and contributes to 
community stability
• capacity building/rebuilding: businesses bring in capital and equipment from outside 
and are effective in training and sharing technical and administrative expertise
• information: governments and donors learn from businesses’ investment decisions, 
since they are based on, inter alia, evaluations of country risk.
• governance: businesses are likely to invest more where there is good governance 
and a secure environment
• philanthropy: it is in the interest of businesses to share in relief efforts and to pro-
vide such things as logistical support
• sensitization: businesses can contribute to reconciliation and consensus building
• negotiating capacity: businesses have negotiating expertise useful in peacemaking 
Source: Adapted from Muia 2003, 260–62.
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Working with the Gjakova community 
improvement council, the program pro-
vided a grant to a local brick factory for 
the purchase of spare parts. The factory 
hired people to produce bricks and then 
provided bricks—equivalent in value to 
the spare parts grant—for use by local 
businesses to repair their buildings. 
Similary, in 2002, an OTI Afghanistan 
Transitional Initiatives Program grant 
financed the construction of a brick fac-
tory in Dar-I-Suf, Samangan province, 
which created employment opportuni-
ties for the local population and pro-
vided bricks to construct or rehabilitate 
schools, public buildings, and houses 
(ReliefWeb 2002).
Farming can often be usefully targeted 
in encouraging microenterprise; it may 
provide benefits in terms of food secu-
rity and community building as well as 
economic gains. Self-employment in 
agriculture was successfully promoted 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina after many 
ex-soldiers expressed a desire to engage 
in small-scale farming rather than work 
for a company (Heinemann-Grüder, 
Pietz, and Duffy 2003, 22). Ex-soldiers 
received livestock and equipment (with 
minimum holding periods to assure 
that they would not be sold on the local 
market) and counseling. This made it 
possible for individuals and families to 
benefit from self-employment in rural 
areas characterized by extended house-
holds (ibid.). 
Agricultural cooperatives may be given 
support as well. Not only do they offer a 
mechanism for more efficient communi-
ty purchasing of inputs and equipment 
and for marketing of small farm output, 
but they also provide an institutional 
basis for community cooperation and 
healing. 
Microfinance institutions and com-
munity credit unions can finance 
self-employment in many kinds of small 
businesses. These institutions provide 
financial services, principally savings and 
borrowing, to small, informal businesses 
that do not have access to commercial 
bank services. Microfinance can help 
jumpstart economic development 
processes for the disadvantaged, even 
under severe conditions (Doyle 1998), 
and thus is particularly appropriate for 
postconflict situations. 
Timing can be crucial in launching 
postconflict microenterprise activities. 
Activities should not be started until 
hostilities have moderated enough so 
that security is not a large concern. On 
the other hand, waiting too long can 
result in losing first-mover advantages: 
markets may be lost to less desirable 
(i.e., shorter-term and more expensive) 
informal sources of finance (Nagarajan 
2003, 228).
With the help of microfinance, the small 
entrepreneur can rapidly be equipped 
to purchase the machinery, equipment, 
and raw materials necessary to be eco-
nomically productive. This is a proven 
way to create access to critical resources 
in communities where other sources 
of credit are restricted or unavailable. 
Under the circumstances of postconflict 
economic sluggishness, micro- and 
small enterprise is much more than a 
safety net: it also widens participation in 
postconflict recovery. 
Microfinance is far from a panacea. It 
must be approached in a businesslike 
way, not used as an entitlement or hand-
The Many Uses of Microfinance
Postconflict microfinance can be viewed as a tool with multiple characteristics:
• an economic development strategy that focuses on rebuilding and restarting  
local economies by providing financial services for self-employment and  
enterprise creation
• a relief and survival strategy in the immediate aftermath of conflict or disaster
• a tool for peace and reconciliation
• a launchpad for financial system reconstruction
• a means of support for transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term  
development
• a way of assuring that some of the needs of the poor are taken into account
• a vehicle that—in the short term—requires few preconditions to start up other than 
reasonable security or stability of access, reemergence of some market activity, and 
reasonable stability of the entrepreneurs receiving loans 
• a way to access financial services when and where other providers are not  
operating
Source: Doyle 1998; Frasier and Saad 2003.
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out, and donors need to incorporate 
capacity building and other safeguards, 
as needed. A case study of postconflict 
microfinance in Mozambique serves as 
an apt cautionary tale. After its civil war 
ended in 1992, Mozambique’s social 
indicators were among the worst in the 
world. Most early microfinance pro-
grams were started as NGO projects or 
as components of larger projects. They 
were ad hoc and intended mainly as 
safety nets serving low-income people. 
In the mid-1990s, donors and NGOs 
reevaluated their microfinance activities 
and began to think more in terms of 
building sustainable institutions. 
Restructuring, however, proved diffi-
cult. After five years of restructuring, no 
microfinance institution had achieved 
financial or operational sustainability. 
The biggest problem was the initial use 
of microfinance as a vehicle for dispens-
ing charity. It was difficult to change 
expectations from emergency handouts 
to a market-based system. Another 
problem was the lack of financial and 
management capacity (Frasier and  
Saad 2003). 
In addition to startup funding for 
implementing organizations, the donor 
should provide technical assistance to 
microenterprise, including training, 
networking, and marketing support. 
Although postconflict loan default rates 
can be expected to be higher than in 
more usual circumstances—because of 
the higher risks endemic to postconflict 
economies—having better business skills 
and more contacts can improve small 
firms’ prospects and their ability to 
service debt. 
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J ob promotion involves counsel-ing, training and retraining, and providing information about 
required job skills, location of jobs, 
and placement services. Such activi-
ties can start early: for example, some 
training, primarily on-the-job, may be 
required for labor-intensive emergency 
job creation programs. However, long-
term job promotion institutions and 
activities must also be expeditiously 
put in place for permanent jobs in 
postconflict societies. 
Projects should use a variety of ways to 
inform the public of the availability of 
these services and how to take advantage 
of them, e.g., posters, radio ads, and 
announcements at churches, mosques, 
cooperatives, relief stations, and other 
gathering places. Civic education pro-
grams directed at ex-combatants and 
others previously engaged in conflict- 
related activities can be an important 
part of a job promotion services menu. 
Support for local civil society orga-
nizations, particularly advocacy and 
social assistance NGOs that can take 
the lead in job promotion activities at 
the community and regional level, is a 
good way to build local capabilities to 
accommodate the local private sector’s 
future labor requirements. Local civil so-
ciety groups, through their social com-
mitment and networking capabilities, 
can substantially improve a community’s 
ability to respond to crises and longer-
term development requirements, includ-
ing employment promotion activities. 
Over the longer term, early support of 
local civil society groups with an interest 
in economic development and commu-
nity livelihoods could result in reduced 
future external assistance requirements 
as communities increase capacity and 
initiative.
There are strong, mutually reinforc-
ing linkages between education/train-
ing, job creation, and local economic 
development. These linkages have been 
recognized and capitalized on in projects 
carried out by a variety of multilateral, 
bilateral, and NGO programs.
• In Timor-Leste, the International La-
bor Organization (ILO) has worked 
since 1999 on several job promotion 
projects in skills training, capacity 
building, inclusion of the disabled, 
and improved labor relations mecha-
nisms (ILO 2000).
• NGOs provide postconflict voca-
tional and educational training to 
vulnerable groups in many countries. 
In Kabul, for example, there are some 
30 NGOs working with Afghan 
women to create opportunities to 
gain or improve vocational skills and 
Job Promotion
  Advocacy and social assistance NGOs can 
take the lead in job promotion activities at the 
community and regional level.
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commence or restart their education 
(ADB 2003, 21).
• In 2001 and 2002, OTI had an 
integrated program in Sierra Leone 
geared to help end the civil war that 
had been going on for most of the 
previous 10 years. This program 
supported reconciliation and reinte-
gration, and focused specifically on 
young people, many of whom had 
not attended school since before the 
civil war began (see box).
Four demobilizations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during 1995–2003 provide 
insights and lessons on the need for em-
ployment promotion, including retrain-
ing, job placement services, and infor-
mation on business opportunities for 
demobilized or downsized armed forces 
in postconflict societies (Heinemann-
Grüder, Pietz, and Duffy 2003). The 
overwhelming majority of soldiers were 
not prepared for postmilitary life while 
still in service, leading to a widespread 
sense of disempowerment and demoral-
ization. Lessons learned from the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina programs with rel-
evance for programs elsewhere include 
the following (ibid.; Walsh 1997):
• demobilization concerns should be 
spelled out in framework agreements 
for peace
• prior to discharge, soldiers should 
receive reliable information on their 
benefit package, retraining, job place-
ment, and job opportunities
• demobilization and reintegration pro-
grams should analyze the educational, 
economic, and social needs of soldiers 
being discharged, and assistance 
should be customized accordingly
• assistance should be demand driven 
and explicitly take local socioeconom-
ic conditions into account 
• small and medium enterprises should 
be promoted, because they can gener-
ate significant employment 
• special employment entitlements 
should not be provided in reintegra-
tion programs
• sustainable structures should be cre-
ated and developed that can provide 
employment opportunities equally 
for everyone 
• special consideration should be 
provided for the most vulnerable: 
disabled, women, dependents, and 
persons suffering from war-related 
stress disorders and mental illness
Although focusing training on target 
groups is sometimes desirable, there can 
be higher social returns if vulnerable 
groups are included in more general 
training programs that include a wider 
range of trainees. Inclusive approaches 
that mix people provide important op-
portunities for sharing experiences and 
encouraging reconciliation (Barcia and 
Date-Bah 2003).
Rapid-Response Schemes
The unemployment generated by the 
closing of state-owned enterprises in 
Hungary in the early 1990s was similar 
in some respects to postconflict unem-
ployment. Well over a quarter of the 
workforce was out of work, and many 
local economies were severely affected. 
In a number of transition countries like 
Hungary, the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL) and USAID have successfully 
combined programs of rapid-response 
worker adjustment and local economic 
development to assist people dislocated 
by mass layoffs and plant closings. 
In Hungary, the successful DOL-
USAID rapid-response program 
included both prelayoff services to fore-
stall long-term unemployment and the 
development of strategies to promote lo-
cal economic development and renewal 
(Keune 2004b, Fazekas and Ozvald 
2004, Hansen and Heidekamp 2004). 
The prelayoff services component would 
be analogous to developing services for 
soldiers before they are actually demobi-
lized. The program was set up in county 
After War, Young Sierra Leoneans Learn Job and Life Skills
In 2001, near the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, OTI created a remedial educa-
tion and skills development network for over 46,000 young adults at some 2,000 
locations. Participants in OTI’s Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace 
program (YRTEP) gained literacy and math skills; learned about self-reliance, conflict 
resolution, and civic participation; and received training in such areas as agriculture 
and health. The YRTEP program was followed by a skills training and employment 
promotion program (STEP) and a skills training and employment generation program 
(STEG). STEP and STEG built on the successes of YRTEP, providing job skills and em-
ployment and facilitating cooperation between ex-combatants and other community 
members (USAID 2003, 40–41).
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labor centers throughout the country. 
Regional employment counselors were 
trained, and reemployment assistance 
committees that included employee 
representatives were created. Program 
activities that would be applicable to 
a postconflict situation included the 
following (adapted from Hansen and 
Heidekamp 2004, 132):
• establishing on-site centers where 
dislocated workers could go for peer 
support, information, and job listings
• arranging information sessions and 
workshops on training programs, 
entrepreneurship, financial and legal 
questions, job search skills, and  
other topics
• communicating with dislocated 
workers and the community at large 
through newsletters, the press, small 
group meetings, interviews and dis-
cussions, etc.
• developing employment opportuni-
ties by holding job fairs, advertis-
ing worker skills, contacting local 
employers, and identifying jobs not 
listed with the employment service
• serving as advocates for dislocated 
workers
• encouraging partnerships with other 
agencies and organizations that may 
have resources to assist in employ-
ment promotion activities, such as 
local enterprise agencies, municipal 
governments, chambers of commerce, 
NGOs, and other civil society organi-
zations
• monitoring the status of dislocated 
jobseekers, tracking placement rates, 
collecting feedback, etc.
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Women
The need of ex-combatants for jobs 
is generally evident. Not so evident is 
that women may have been among the 
combatants. In Angola, El Salvador, and 
Eritrea, for example, 30 percent or more 
of the combatants were female (Ban-
non 2003, 20; Kingma 2001, 36). Even 
women who do not become fighters 
during conflict often acquire new roles 
and responsibilities. Unfortunately, once 
conflict ends, female ex-combatants 
suddenly become invisible, and “women 
and girls are generally expected to 
quietly revert back to their pre-conflict 
roles, giving up freedoms, social capital, 
labor market participation, political 
influence or networking capabilities 
they may have gained as a result of the 
conflict” (Kingma 2001). 
It is therefore important not to ignore 
women in designing postconflict job 
creation projects; in fact, their circum-
stances may require special attention. 
Many women have been left as house-
hold heads, without the cultural support 
or personal skills to take on increased 
responsibilities. Moreover, women are 
just as likely as men to have lost homes 
and livelihoods. Not only should they 
participate in emergency job projects, 
but particular attention should be given 
to creating sustainable employment  
opportunities for them.
Should a country’s legal system discrimi-
nate against women, efforts should be 
made to help them protect and validate 
In the aftermath of conflict, many specific groups of people may have particular need for immediate aid. 
However, peace preservation objectives 
call for providing assistance impartially. 
Moreover, international law forbids 
distributing humanitarian aid on a 
discriminatory basis, even in a situation 
of active hostilities (Dungel 2004, part 
2.2). No preference or exclusion based 
on nationality, race, religious belief, 
class, or political opinion is acceptable. 
Nonetheless, relative need can be a 
justifiable basis for discrimination. 
Therefore, age, disability, sex and other 
characteristics can be used as criteria 
for distributing humanitarian assis-
tance, including job creation programs.
Groups that may require special con- 
sideration in designing jobs programs 
may include people with prior conflict-
related employment; displaced persons 
seeking reintegration; and women, 
youth, the disabled, people with ob-
solete or redundant skills, and other 
vulnerable groups. No group should be 
singled out for apparent favoritism, be-
cause it could regenerate problems that 
led to the initial conflict. Nevertheless, 
appropriate job opportunities should be 
available for differently situated people. 
Special Group Needs 
  In Angola, El Salvador, and Eritrea, 30 percent or 
more of the combatants were female.
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their new roles and responsibilities. 
Strengthening women’s financial base 
and economic contribution to their 
families and communities is an im-
portant means of empowering them 
(Cheston and Kuhn 2002, 11–57). 
Microenterprise opportunities afforded 
by making loans to women enhance 
women’s participation and status in 
household affairs and decisionmaking, 
improve their self-confidence, pro-
vide a mechanism for their increased 
involvement in the community, and 
make them more aware of their rights. 
Microenterprise is an ideal way for 
women to retain some of the social and 
economic gains they may have made 
during conflict.
Emphasizing women’s participation in 
postconflict microenterprise projects 
makes particular sense because women 
have demonstrated worldwide that 
they are hardworking, responsible, 
and generally better credit risks than 
men. For example, Sinapi Aba Trust, 
Opportunity International’s partner 
institution in a microenterprise project 
in Ghana, found significant differences 
in the repayment record of men and 
women, with men’s arrears averaging 
2.5 times those of women (ibid., 9–10). 
Postconflict job and enterprise projects 
that leave out women thus sacrifice 
some of their best chances for effective-
ness. Moreover, when women are left 
behind economically, the country as a 
whole suffers; several recent studies have 
shown a strong correlation between 
gender-based discrimination and poor 
development indices (ibid., 7).
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
makes postconflict empowerment of 
women an integral part of its programs 
in Afghanistan and other countries 
(ADB 2003, 21). For example, the 
ADB’s Kandahar–Spin Boldak road 
rehabilitation project near the Afghan-
Pakistan border—which strongly en-
courages subcontracting with local firms 
to provide jobs to locals and displaced 
persons—includes livelihood training 
and credit facilities to create income-
generating activities for homebased 
returning women refugees (ibid., 21; 
ADB 2005). The project offers childcare 
and promotes community-based girls’ 
education (ADB 2003, 21).
Other examples of appropriate work 
opportunities for women addressing 
their reintegration and livelihood chal-
lenges include the Knitting Together 
Nations project in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which produces, markets, and 
sells knitwear, and a women-oriented 
UN Development Program (UNDP) 
project, Community Action for the Re-
integration and Recovery of Youth and 
Women in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Bannon 2003, 21).
Empowerment does not happen auto-
matically. Cheston and Kuhn’s survey 
of microfinanance projects targeting 
women found that “several program-
matic factors . . . can make a positive 
contribution to women’s empowerment 
and holistic transformation, including 
business training, discussion of social 
issues, support and advice for balanc-
ing family and business responsibilities, 
[and] experience in decision making and 
leadership” (Cheston and Kuhn 2002, 
5). Projects need to approach this chal-
lenge systematically, examining factors 
ranging from the selection and training 
of loan officers to guidelines for internal 
governance of local microfinance groups 
(ibid., 42–44).
Children and Youth
The lives of children and youth are of-
ten severely disrupted by conflict. They 
may have been recruited as combat-
ants, missed out on an education, lost 
families and homes, seen friends and 
neighbors die, and endured injuries, 
illness, hunger, and fear. Just as with 
women, young people at risk are often 
ignored. Rebuilding their lives may 
require substantial support, counseling, 
and assurances of security. 
Moreover, according to Achio and 
Specht (2003, 154–8), conflict changes 
the position of youth and children in 
society: they are active survivors, and, 
as is the case with adult women, they 
need postconflict equivalents of the 
roles played during conflict. Unfortu-
nately, even where there are viable jobs 
for older experienced workers when the 
conflict is over, jobs for young people 
may be scarce. It is especially important 
to give them opportunities for appro-
priate training for productive employ-
ment. In addition, restarting educa-
tion programs when conflict ends and 
encouraging young people to return to 
school will prepare them for better jobs, 
provide businesses with better-trained 
people when they will be needed, and 
take young people out of a possibly 
unfriendly, volatile labor market.
A remarkable program in Colombia il-
lustrates the benefits of taking a holistic 
approach to postconflict reintegration 
needs. In 2001, when several thousand 
child soldiers were serving in Colombia’s 
three largest armed rebel groups, OTI 
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initiated a program to reintegrate 
escaped or captured Colombian child 
soldiers into society (USAID 2003, 
20–21). Implemented through the 
International Organization for Migra-
tion, in coordination with the Insti-
tuto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar 
(Colombian Family Welfare Institute) 
and several local NGOs, the program 
worked to meet the medical, counseling, 
education, and vocational training needs 
of ex-combatant children. 
Some 450 children were accommodated 
in five special OTI-sponsored centers 
during the first year. The program also 
undertook a comprehensive review of 
Colombian laws pertaining to children 
as ex-combatants, which led to the 
development of legislation allowing 
their decriminalization and to special 
training for judges and public defenders. 
In addition to helping children recover 
from wartime trauma and prepare to 
support themselves through jobs, the 
reintegration program strengthened 
the capacity of local NGOs concerned 
about the welfare of children and helped 
build linkages between civil society and 
government.
Disabled People
People with impairments of various 
kinds are often far more numerous in 
the aftermath of conflict than in more 
normal situations. Their ranks may in-
clude wounded ex-combatants, injured 
civilians, civilians mutilated to terror-
ize their neighbors, landmine victims 
of all kinds, people with war-related 
mental illnesses, children physically and 
mentally disabled by malnutrition, and 
people crippled by untreated disease or 
infections. 
Even where there is no conflict, the 
disabled are among the most vulner-
able and discriminated-against people 
in developing countries. Discrimination 
against the disabled takes three basic 
forms: institutional (e.g., excluding 
disabled children from school), environ-
mental (presence of physical barriers to 
using public transportation, to entering 
buildings, and the like), and attitudinal 
(fear and embarrassment in the presence 
of disabled persons) (DFID 2000, 8). 
The most vulnerable of all are women 
and children with physical impairments. 
Disabled children are among the most 
likely to be ignored and neglected, and 
accordingly they suffer high death rates, 
with mortality as high as 80 percent in 
some countries where overall under-five 
mortality is less than 20 percent (ibid., 
5). Impaired women and girls suffer 
discrimination due to both their gender 
and their disabilities, being severely 
socially and economically marginalized 
as a result. Disabled women are two to 
three times as likely to undergo physi-
cal or sexual abuse as their nondisabled 
counterparts (ibid., 3).
Although as many as 20 percent of poor 
people around the world may be dis-
abled, development policy and practice 
aimed at poverty reduction rarely focus 
on them; the disabled “usually remain 
invisible and excluded” (EDF 2002, 6). 
Recognizing the plight of the disabled 
and addressing the problems they face 
are key issues for donor attention in all 
development and humanitarian assis-
tance programs. 
The Swedish Disabled International 
Aid Association emphasizes five basic 
principles that constitute good practice 
in government and NGO policy for the 
disabled (adapted from DFID 2000, 8). 
Briefly, the disabled should have
1. social protection in terms of  
access to housing, health care, 
rehabilitation services, and access 
devices (prostheses, crutches, hearing 
aids, etc.)
2. access to education, credit, 
information, and opportunities to 
earn an income
3. consciousness of their own needs and 
rights and of the consequences of 
society’s attitudes
4. equal opportunities to influence 
decision- and policymaking through 
participatory processes
5. the right to take initiatives to 
assert their influence and promote 
awareness of their rights, thereby 
increasing control over resources and 
benefits
A promising approach to overcoming 
discrimination against and exclusion 
of the disabled is community-based 
rehabilitation, or CBR (DFID 2000, 9). 
CBR combines physical rehabilitation 
through medical care with empower-
ment and social inclusion through 
the joint participation of the disabled 
individual and the community. It has 
been found to be both cost-effective and 
successful in improving social integra-
tion (ibid.). Boyce (2003) indicates that 
CBR is not only adaptable to conflict 
situations, but when successfully done 
may play a part in postconflict com-
munity healing and health/social sector 
reform.
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programs, or to USAID/Washington for 
programs in other countries.
Other sources of assistance to the dis-
abled include Handicap International, 
the Red Cross Special Fund for the 
Disabled, and UNICEF. The United 
Nations Mine Action Service and the 
Landmine Survivors Network address 
disabilities caused by landmines.
criminated against, or that the activity’s 
managers make a proactive, conscious 
effort to include them. The main thrust 
of USAID’s policy on the disabled is 
therefore not to mandate discrete proj-
ects and funding (although some mis-
sions do have them) but to mainstream 
appropriate attention to the disabled in 
all of its programs and activities. 
USAID appropriations for famine and 
disease prevention already work to 
prevent and correct the impairments as-
sociated with malnutrition and disease. 
In addition, USAID has designated 
significant funding for programs offer-
ing rehabilitative assistance to civilian 
victims of war and torture, as well as aid 
to vulnerable children. There is special 
funding for 
• grants and cooperative agreements for 
domestic, foreign, and international 
NGOs working with vulnerable chil-
dren affected by conflict or otherwise 
deprived of appropriate caregiving 
(Displaced Children and Orphans 
Fund)
• direct, cost-effective assistance to war 
victims and the disabled (Leahy War 
Victims Fund)
• work with torture victims and their 
families to treat physical, psycho-
logical, and other effects of torture 
(Victims of Torture Fund). 
Proposals to obtain funding from the 
above sources, or to provide support to 
specific USAID programs with an em-
phasis on health issues and the disabled, 
may be unsolicited. They should be sub-
mitted directly to USAID missions in 
countries where USAID has assistance 
It is especially important for donors not 
to overlook the needs of the disabled af-
ter conflict ends. Postconflict situations 
exacerbate the vulnerability of disabled 
members of a community at a time 
when their numbers have grown much 
larger. They are often less able than 
other survivors to compete for scarce 
jobs or aid benefits. Those disabled as 
a result of conflict may suffer further 
discrimination because they are held to 
blame or, at best, are a reminder of a 
painful time.
Excluding disabled adults from job cre-
ation and promotion efforts is especially 
shortsighted, since they are typically 
eager to work, and recovery is harmed 
when the economy is needlessly saddled 
with large groups of unproductive survi-
vors. As the European Disability Forum 
points out, “Reconstruction efforts in 
post-conflict situations need to include 
[the disabled] in the re-building of their 
society” (EDF 2002, 6). The employ-
ment needs of disabled persons should 
be accommodated with supported 
temporary community-based jobs and 
related on-the-job services, such as 
counseling, rehabilitation, training, and 
placement in appropriate long-term jobs 
(GPCDD 1989).
USAID recognizes that the problems 
of the disabled must be considered 
if its international development and 
humanitarian assistance programs are 
to be effective. In 1997, it published 
groundbreaking policy guidance on 
inclusion of the disabled as beneficiaries 
and participants in all development 
activities (USAID 1997). Generally, 
when implementing an assistance activ-
ity, it does not cost significantly more to 
assure that the disabled are not dis-
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Local Economic Development
growth and job creation should there-
fore emphasize support for adequate 
decentralization and for building local 
capacity to promote economic develop-
ment. Appropriate autonomy and reliable, 
sustainable sources of funding are essential.
Mechanisms of Local  
Development
Local economic development im-
proves local standards of living through 
increased jobs and incomes resulting 
from business investment. Although it is 
not always necessary, local governments 
must often take the initiative to organize 
and plan economic development activi-
ties in the aftermath of conflict. Alter-
natively, a local development council 
may take the lead; such a council can be 
organized by donors, a national gov-
ernment, or a community civil society 
organization. 
Local governments or development 
councils can focus on growing busi-
nesses by providing or identifying 
sources of startup support, training, 
and technical support services. Priority 
local economic development objectives 
include attracting new local, national, 
and international investment; working 
with local banks and donors to develop 
mechanisms giving access to investment 
capital for local entrepreneurs (especially 
micro, small, and medium enterprises); 
and job counseling, training, and place-
ment services. 
It is critically important to stimu-late economic growth and devel-opment after conflict.6 Economic 
development and permanent job cre-
ation occur in concert. On one hand, 
new jobs help to stimulate economic 
growth. On the other hand, only re-
newed, sustained economic growth can 
generate the economic and social foun-
dations that assure stable, long-term 
employment and steady improvement 
in household livelihoods and wellbeing. 
Local economies are the economic 
engines of national economies and must 
be a cornerstone of postconflict develop-
ment work. However, after a conflict it 
is not always feasible to rely on a central 
government to organize development 
activities in local communities through-
out the country. Moreover, local eco-
nomic development ultimately depends 
on local knowledge and commitment 
and on the participation of community 
leaders, businesspeople, and civil society. 
Countrywide strategies for long-term 
6 See, for example, Suhrke et al. 2004, Collier 2002, 
Collier et al. 2003, Burnside and Dollar 2000, and 
Collier and Hoeffler 2000.
  It is often useful to foster the formation of 
business clusters—groups of interrelated, 
competing firms with links to information, 
suppliers, markets, and services of all kinds. 
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It is often useful to foster the formation 
of business clusters—groups of inter-
related, competing firms with business-
generating linkages. Clustering provides 
synergy and access to information, 
suppliers, markets, and services of all 
kinds, including association building for 
networking, professional and specialist 
services, joint purchasing and market-
ing, and so on (Fairbanks and Brennan 
2004). 
Partnerships are fundamental to local 
economic development and job creation. 
The best response of local authorities to 
a cessation of hostilities is to organize 
partnerships among local government 
institutions, private businesses, and 
community civil society organizations to 
promote economic development. Such 
partnerships may take a tremendous 
range of forms. USAID, for example, 
has made it a priority to engage private 
corporations, foundations, trade associa-
tions, and NGOs to work with it in 
different kinds of assistance programs. 
USAID and ChevronTexaco formed an 
alliance to co-invest in projects in small 
and medium-sized enterprise develop-
ment and agriculture in Angola. The 
alliance’s initial activities have assisted 
families affected by civil war (former 
soldiers and internally displaced people) 
by providing agricultural support and 
training, thereby consolidating the 
peace. It has also launched programs in 
microcredit and distance learning, as 
well as a Center for Enterprise Develop-
ment (ChevronTexaco 2004). The most 
important idea is to work together, mo-
bilizing and sharing resources to solve 
common problems. 
Implicitly, partnerships’ efforts must rely 
on the private sector as the source of 
new jobs. Donor input would include 
training programs and placement 
services for workers, as well as technical 
assistance and training in finance and 
management for micro and small busi-
ness owners. 
Postconflict economic recovery should 
not be assumed to be rapid. Employ-
ment opportunities may seem to expand 
more slowly than economic activity 
does, even if this is not the case. One 
reason for this is that although nominal 
growth rates may seem robust, they may 
be from a much smaller economic base 
than what existed before the conflict. 
Decentralization Caveats
Successful local economic development 
requires adequate decentralization—the 
reassignment of responsibilities and rev-
enue streams from higher to lower levels 
of government. Besides the fact that lo-
cal officials frequently prove more dedi-
cated and successful promoters of local 
economic development than central 
government authorities, decentralization 
is generally considered desirable in itself 
as a democracy-enhancing undertaking. 
Nevertheless, decentralization can lead 
to unintended results, especially in the 
most underdeveloped areas, where good 
local government managers are scarce. 
For example, according to the OECD, 
many postconflict African countries 
“have experienced increased corrup-
tion, disinvestment in public goods, and 
increasing regional disparities as a result 
of devolving powers too quickly away 
from the central state” (OECD 2004). 
This is partly because of unqualified 
local managers, and partly because the 
opportunities for bureaucratic rentseek-
ing are often irresistible. 
Bureaucratic corruption is a failure 
of governance at whatever level it is 
practiced. In postconflict situations, it 
may also threaten the peace.  In many 
cases, local governments can manage 
some resources dedicated to promoting 
local economic development and job 
creation, but how well this can be done 
will vary greatly. As early as possible, do-
nors should assess the capacity of local 
government units or other local organi-
zations expected to carry out commu-
nity and local economic development 
activities. Both strengths and weaknesses 
of likely recipients should be carefully 
evaluated, particularly their ability to 
manage and account for transfers of 
funding. Such assessments will help do-
nors estimate the level of oversight and 
technical assistance local actors will need 
and to plan for preproject and inservice 
capacity building, as required. In addi-
tion, as activities progress, it is crucial 
to conduct regular audits of financial 
transfers and their uses. 
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W hen conflict ends, it is usually the private sector that is best able to drive 
economic growth and new employ-
ment. How successful the private sec-
tor is in creating jobs directly affects 
long-term stability. But the quality 
and capacity of a country’s politi-
cal governance (national and local), 
its social and economic policies, and 
its institutional foundations are all 
critical determinants of the private 
sector’s vitality.
Responsive political and economic gov-
ernance institutions that adhere to the 
rule of law and are impartial, predict-
able, and trusted are key to stimulat-
ing private sector businesses to quickly 
engage in postconflict investment 
that puts people to work. An honest, 
transparent regulatory framework is also 
vital. Particularly important are viable 
legal institutions that guarantee prop-
erty rights and the sanctity of contracts, 
along with at least rudimentary financial 
intermediation services to channel fund-
ing for investment into more efficient 
economic activities. Functioning finan-
cial markets and supporting institutions 
can be useful for funding components 
of the initial recovery and rebuilding, 
but they are essential to efficient future 
economic development, sustained rapid 
growth, and job creation.
Balancing Social and 
Economic Policy 
Social and economic factors do not 
work in isolation from each other. After 
a conflict, there should be a dialogue 
between social partners, the private sec-
tor, and government on ways to restore 
or establish private sector confidence 
and capabilities. Postconflict social and 
economic policies should be crafted and 
carried out together to maximize the 
likelihood that the peace will be kept 
and to encourage the economic growth 
needed for long-term job creation. Such 
a jointly determined policy environ-
ment will focus on enabling productive 
private enterprise to operate efficiently 
while favoring responsive, reassuring 
social policies.
On the economic side, three factors 
are generally considered prerequisites 
for sustainable growth: good economic 
policies, economic governance institu-
tions that facilitate business opera-
tions, and responsible macroeconomic 
management. Early implementation of 
Creating an Enabling Policy 
Environment
  It is important to recognize that employment 
usually takes longer to recover after a crisis than 
the general economy does.
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because the pace of economic recovery 
and the distribution of productive as-
sets can be affected far into the future 
should dirigiste restrictions continue 
in effect after conflict ends.7 (Examples 
include wage and price controls, export 
restrictions, and restrictions on the use 
of certain materials.) Following sound 
economic principles is always timely and 
appropriate, and postconflict rebuilding 
is a good time to assure that the reason-
ably orthodox national economic poli-
cies needed to permit effective private 
sector–led economic recovery are in 
place and understood. These would in-
clude prudent, liberal policies to ensure
• fiscal discipline, including setting 
public expenditure priorities with 
favorable benefit-cost ratios (with, of 
course, adequate attention to health, 
education, social safety nets, and 
poverty reduction measures)
• a broad tax base with low rates
• minimal price controls on goods and 
services as well as on interest rates and 
exchange rates
• reasonably free trade with minimal 
nontariff controls on imports and ex-
ports of goods and services (competi-
tion from abroad is usually good, but 
should be monitored in postconflict, 
fragile states)
• minimum controls on foreign direct 
investment (except perhaps on short- 
term or speculative investment  
inflows and outflows)
• a focus on the private sector to drive 
growth and permanent job creation 
in a facilitative regulatory environ-
ment, including a flexible labor 
market
• minimal barriers to new businesses
One caveat to bear in mind: basic eco-
nomic governance institutions are just 
as important as sound economic poli-
cies. Policies mean little if they cannot 
be implemented. For instance, should 
economic governance institutions be 
particularly weak, as may be the case 
in some postconflict failed states, the 
advantages of an open trade regime and 
other private sector incentives that foster 
economic growth and job creation may 
also be weak. This situation calls for pri-
ority attention to political and economic 
governance issues.8
The economic policy framework should 
be calibrated to stabilize macroeconomic 
financial structures, with the goal of 
keeping inflation within acceptable 
bounds. However, implementation 
should not be so rigid that it becomes a 
serious obstacle to social and economic 
recovery and job creation. It is impor-
tant to recognize that employment 
well-conceived economic reforms allows 
a more stable, faster, broader-based 
recovery. So does swift action to assure 
that basic economic governance institu-
tions are operational. 
Appropriate social policies are also 
important to postconflict rebuilding and 
recovery. In fact, recent research indi-
cates that they are more critical than is 
often assumed (Bannon 2003, 27):
 Social policy is relatively more impor-
tant, and macro policy relatively less, 
in postconflict settings than in similar 
countries without a recent history of 
conflict. The effect appears quite large 
and suggests that if opportunities ex-
ist for modest tradeoffs that improve 
social policies at the expense of a 
small deterioration in macro balances, 
growth is, on average, augmented.
Responsive, inclusive social policies in 
the aftermath of conflict, such as ensur-
ing access to healthcare and food sup-
plies for all groups in need, send strong 
signals of a government’s commitment 
to peace and reconciliation. They may 
also “reassure the private sector and 
reduce its risk perceptions, thus encour-
aging investment and the repatriation 
of capital” (ibid., 28). Such policies 
need to include emergency job creation, 
should there be widespread unemploy-
ment, coupled with good employment 
promotion policies and activities for the 
longer term.
The foregoing cautions about the need 
for responsive social policies do not 
mean that economic policies should be 
lax. It is especially important to assess 
the postconflict relevance of policies and 
controls that may have been introduced 
to meet the special needs of wartime, 
7 See Tony Addison, “Communities, Private 
Sectors, and States,” (2003) pp. 263–287 for 
a discussion of the problems and impacts of 
postconflict policy issues and decisions, including 
consequences for vulnerable populations 
and resolving conflicts between private and 
community interests.
8 USAID’s strategic priorities for fragile states 
(see USAID 2005, 5) recognize the importance 
of good political and economic governance in 
creating stability. The strategy document points 
out that “while governance is clearly a linchpin 
to recovery, reforms may well be required early 
on in multiple sectors, such as the critical social 
and economic areas,” adding that “building the 
capacity of institutions that serve key social 
and economic sectors . . . will reduce stress and 
vulnerability, especially among poorer populations, 
[and] will also speed recovery from conflict.” 
The strategy also underlines the importance of 
generating employment in conditions of fragility, 
noting that “support for economic activities that 
lead to job creation, improved family incomes, 
and better-functioning markets can, in most cases, 
contribute to greater economic stability.”
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usually takes longer to recover after a 
crisis than the general economy does. 
It is especially important that a govern-
ment not announce far-ranging reforms 
that it cannot carry out. Credibility is 
an indispensable asset that governments 
cannot afford to waste, especially those 
presiding over postconflict rebuilding 
activities.
While a low inflation rate of, say,  
3 percent a year or less is attractive to 
investors, there may not be a need to 
aim for full elimination, or even drastic 
reduction, of inflation within a short 
timeframe. Should inflation be on the 
order of 10–20 percent a year, achieving 
a steady decline should be the principal 
policy objective, with targets for the first 
year in, say, the 5–10 percent range, 
and 3–5 percent by the third year. On 
the other hand, should inflation be very 
high and chaotic, say 10–20 percent per 
month, temporary recourse to a curren-
cy board or adoption of a third-country 
currency may be credible options for 
stabilizing an economy and reviving 
trade and investment. This is particu-
larly the case if the basic institutions  
of political and economic governance 
are weak.
Carefully assessing the patterns and 
magnitudes of public sector spending 
should be a priority as soon as possible 
after conflict ends. Significant reforms 
may be necessary. Particularly important 
is caution about the kinds and timing of 
initiatives donors may be planning, as 
well as the immediate and longer-term 
impacts of donor programs on national 
budgets. There should be a concerted ef-
fort to prioritize and evaluate the spend-
ing of national and local governments 
and donors in the context of a coherent 
framework for postconflict economic 
policy.
The economic policy framework should 
explicitly take into account the likely 
impacts of limited revenue collection 
and the need for relatively high spend-
ing by the government and donors on 
extensive programs of humanitarian 
relief, social protection, and reconstruc-
tion. Donor budget support can have an 
important role in this situation. Budget 
and balance of payments support with 
limited conditionality can be designed 
as a single package. 
A major objective of postconflict 
economic policy is to encourage the re-
vival of the country’s local and national 
markets and to restore its participation 
in regional and international export 
markets. The breadth and depth of 
economic recovery in terms of market 
participation conditions the pace of 
job growth. Increased domestic and 
international trade rewards countries 
with more jobs. Accordingly, getting 
and keeping prices right is an important 
policy objective. Realizing this objec-
tive usually means minimizing interfer-
ence in prices, whether the prices are 
for domestic or imported goods and 
services, money markets (interest rates), 
or foreign exchange. 
Encouraging Trade, 
Investment, and Hiring 
Trade restrictions, including high tariffs 
and quotas, should be kept to a mini-
mum.9 During the early postconflict 
period, it would be attractive to inves-
tors should the exchange rate be slightly 
undervalued. However, investors also 
like exchange rates that are relatively 
stable and flexible. Accordingly, the 
exchange rate should at least have the 
flexibility to move freely within a band 
defined by the currency or currencies 
of principal trading partners soon after 
conflict has ended. If there is a currency 
board, of course, the exchange rate is 
fixed with respect to a reference cur-
rency, or a small basket of currencies, 
and would fluctuate automatically as the 
reference fluctuates with respect to all 
other currencies. In addition to a facili-
tative exchange rate and relatively open 
economy, targeted official and private 
sector export promotion activities will 
usually result in faster permanent job 
creation.
Although there must be vigilance to 
prevent human trafficking, abuse, and 
exploitation, minimum wage regulations 
are unlikely to be productive. For their 
part, emergency employment programs 
should target wages at levels that are low 
enough not to interfere with emerging 
9 For some excellent discussions of U.S. 
involvement in postconflict reconstruction 
and the power of an open trade regime 
in postconflict societies, see Lewarne and 
Snelbecker 2004.
  Increased trade rewards countries with more jobs, 
but this requires getting and keeping prices right. 
Realizing this objective usually means minimizing 
interference in prices.
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market-clearing wages of the private 
sector, but that are still competitive 
with the actual or in-kind remuneration 
earned in conflict activities, either as a 
regular soldier or as a rebel. 
Generally speaking, it is reasonable to 
assume that local subcontractors know 
the “acceptable” wage ranges for the 
unskilled and semiskilled laborers who 
would be offered the bulk of employ-
ment under an emergency jobs program. 
Donors should, however, assure regular 
monitoring of local subcontractors (e.g., 
make sure laborers are receiving the full 
wage reported by the subcontractor), 
especially if corruption is known to be 
significant in the country’s experience 
and culture.
Postconflict economic policies at all 
levels should provide a generally lib-
eral environment oriented specifically 
to facilitate and support private sector 
investment and job creation. Starting 
new businesses should be encouraged by 
keeping red tape to a minimum. There 
should be overall consistency and con-
stancy in policies toward businesses: the 
rules of the game should be clear and 
not subject to frequent changes or ad-
ministrative caprice. Tax policy should 
emphasize a business-friendly tax system 
that can be relatively easy to apply, and 
does not impose taxes on labor that 
would serve as a disincentive to private 
sector hiring.
The effectiveness of long-term private 
sector job creation can be expected to 
vary in accordance with the sophistica-
tion of political and economic gover-
nance institutions; the country’s core 
economic policy framework; the flex-
ibility of the basic incentives framework 
of business taxes; the legislation, rules, 
and regulations affecting the formation 
of new businesses; and the conditions  
of employment, worker compensation, 
and the like. 
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In the preceding overview, we  have seen not only the urgency of setting up specific programs to 
create jobs in the wake of conflict, but 
also the complexity and many pitfalls 
attending such efforts. 
Common flaws in donor responses to 
this situation include the following:
• donors overlook the need for active 
job programs altogether, assuming 
that general programs to stimulate 
economic regrowth will automatically 
generate substantial employment
• donors wait too long to start, not 
realizing that job creation can begin 
in one part of a country even while 
fighting is continuing in another
• donors stop too soon, limiting their 
programs to short-term, stopgap 
programs that cannot remedy the 
structural unemployment common 
after a conflict
• donors commit money for recovery 
programs shortly after a conflict ends 
(or after it shrinks enough to justify 
undertaking recovery efforts), but 
come through with only a fraction of 
the sums originally promised
• donors use expatriate labor and 
imported heavy machinery in 
postconflict reconstruction work 
instead of using local labor and more 
labor-intensive technology
It is impossible to overstress the need 
for donors to commit job creation funds 
for the long haul—a decade or more 
if the conflict has been severe. Projects 
offering short-term jobs must segue into 
programs that promote longer-term, 
less ad hoc, more stable opportunities. 
This principle, however, is out of synch 
with the relatively short attention spans 
of many developed countries. Even 
donors who fund job programs, and 
postconflict aid in general, for several 
years following a conflict often allow aid 
to dwindle after the first year or two. Yet 
research shows that assistance is most 
effective if it rises in tandem with the 
recovering economy’s ability to make 
good use of it, usually from the fourth 
to the seventh year. 
Donors embarking on job creation 
programs must incorporate a daunting 
variety of elements into their work with 
affected populations. These may include 
surveys and censuses; training and 
counseling; health and rehabilitation 
programs; community and cooperative 
development; support for democratic 
governance; diverse funding modalities, 
Conclusions
  Research shows that assistance is most effective if 
it rises in tandem with the recovering economy’s 
ability to make good use of it, usually from the 
fourth to the seventh year. 
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from budget support to microcredit 
to food for work; and attention to the 
special needs of ex-combatants, women, 
youth, and the disabled. 
In addition, donors must look to the 
enabling environment for the country’s 
economy. This means assessing and sup-
porting changes as needed in business 
and trade law, finance, monetary policy, 
infrastructure, anticorruption systems, 
and information technology and access. 
It also entails ensuring a level playing 
field for participants without regard 
to gender, ethnicity, religion, region, 
disabilities, and similar traits that may 
mark people for discrimination.
Issues for USAID and other donors to 
consider include the following:
• How can donors best plan and 
budget for long-term as well as short-
term job creation programs after a 
conflict—and persuade other donors 
to do so?
• What is the best mix of food for 
work, cash for work, microcredit, 
farm cooperative credit, and/or other 
payment mechanisms for beneficiaries 
of a job creation project? 
• How can postconflict reconstruction 
efforts be planned to make maximum 
use of local labor, preferably in com-
bination with training, community 
building, and other elements that 
make long-term success likelier?
• How can donors handle job and  
microcredit programs so as to avoid 
the “entitlement” trap?
• What mechanisms already exist for 
donors to coordinate their work and 
to exchange lessons and best prac-
tices? What additional platforms, 
networks, or clearinghouses may  
need to be set up?
As even this abbreviated discussion 
makes clear, job creation requires 
serious, sustained attention to a broad 
and varied range of factors to have 
any chance of succeeding. Yet when 
it does succeed, its benefits often flow 
into a number of different domains as 
well. Good jobs programs can help to 
fight hunger and disease, raise capacity, 
restore infrastructure, protect or repair 
the environment, and set the country on 
the road to economic independence. On 
the social level, they can heal trauma-
tized survivors, knit communities closer 
together, and give participants dignity 
and hope. 
Conversely, when the need for jobs after 
conflict goes unmet, it may well pave 
the way for disaffection, mistrust, and 
renewed violence. Short- and long-term 
job creation should be an important 
part of the training of all profession-
als working in postconflict relief and 
reconstruction—and an automatic part 
of all plans to deal with the formidable 
challenges of postconflict assistance.
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